MVW D-1/3a
March 17, 1959

71.

MACHILLAN TALKS Washington, March 19-23, 19-9

Europeen Security (Post Sion Person)


in emplier version of this paper, eleculated as D-1/3,
who drawled by GER - Mr. Leopeen and elected by EUR - Mr. Kohler;
CML - No. Vigdorneus EVAS - Mr. Calliven; St - Mr. Possenden;
MR. - Mr. Enthort and ER - Mr. Hoftenney. The attached paper
toplicast D-1/3, which should be declarated.

This paper reliects the selimoments used in D-1/3 at an interbureau meeting in the lating Bearstany's office on Merch 16.

All is aire lated for your information.

/Ann G. Jemes 8/8-R0 Acco 5274, 9xt. 3415





STORY

MacMillan Talks Washington, March 19-23, 1959

European Security

Anticipated British Position

- 1. The British may urgo limited steps on European security in advance of progress on German reunification. They may cite Khrushchev telks as substantiating their belief that the USSR might accept some proposals in this field and argue that oven a limited agreement would reduce the danger of war over Berlin.
- 2. They may suggest a sone of limitation of forces, with inspection in an area of Germany east of the Rhine and a corresponding area east of the GDR frontier.
- 3. They may suggest a small concession towards relaxation of tensions by proposing that a narrow sone along the frontier in West Germany be demilitarized. They may argue this would not represent any change in actual British deployment since British troops are not now advanced beyond the Weser River.
- 4. They will probably agree that no major shift in troop deployment can be contemplated unless an agreement on reunification is reached.

Recommended United States Position

- 1. Minited European security agreements not linked with German rounification would only result in strategic gains for the USER without compensating gains for us. The arrangements could create an illusion that the threat had been reduced, whereas we feet the basic security situation would not be improved. The Horth Atlantic Goussell has studied and rejected proposals of this character, such as the Rappack! Plan, both in its original form and as modified.
- 2. The question of an inspection some and arms limitations in Europe is primarily for the West Europeans to decide. Noither the French nor the Germans sam disposed to accept such a plan. Also, there are advantages to linking a some of inspection in Europe to one which would provide protection against surprise attack output a larger area: e.g., the Arotic.
- 3. A limited agreement confined to a narrow demilitarized zone based on the discilled line between East and West Cormany would be dengerous in creating the illusion of reduced threat while not in fact changing the basic security situation. It would be a political gain for the USSR without any compensating gains on our part.
- 4. We there the British view that major troop deployments can only be considered to consection with a political settlement which for European deployment means German ramplification. Hewever, our security and roundfloation proposals might be more affectively presented if related note closely with our over-all disarrament proposals a.g., linking troop reductions in Europe to the over-all reductions we proposed in London in 1957 if certain political problems were solved.

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